$ cat ai-safety-evals/month/2026-10-01.log
the month in review · October 2026
Inspect 0.3.286 locks down sandbox file access
By RepoJournal · composed from the cited sources · human-reviewed weekly · methodology
Petri 3.1.1 and inspect_evals 0.27.0 also close host-takeover and filesystem escape paths, and inspect_ai drops Python 3.10.
v0.3.286 UKGovernmentBEIS/inspect_ai
by github-actions[bot]
Docker `read_file()` now runs as the container's default execution user rather than through Docker's privileged copy API, so any code that relied on reading root-owned paths must pass user="root" explicitly. The release notes also list a fix that blocks writable host mounts, the change that most directly affects what a task's sandbox can reach on your machine.
fix: enforce filesystem boundaries for resources and exports safety-research/petri
Resource searches could read outside `allowed_paths`: `search_in_files` ran the auditor's free-form grep arguments and only filtered output lines by filename prefix, which arguments like `-h . ../outside.txt` suppressed. If you run Petri against models you don't trust, 3.1.1 is the version that restores the guarantee the tool advertises.
fix: drop target tool options so providers cannot run tools server-side safety-research/petri
Target tools were supposed to be synthetic, intercepted by the auditor on every call, but `ToolInfo.options` let inspect's model providers execute some of them inside the API call where the auditor never saw them. Seed tools passed those options straight through; 3.1.1 drops them.
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