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NODE STRIPS 14 ROOT CERTIFICATES, ADDS PERMISSION.DROP CONTROL
By RepoJournal · Filed · About Node.js
Node's certificate store just got pruned hard, removing 14 trusted roots including DigiCert and COMODO, while a new permission.drop API gives you runtime control over what your code can access.
The crypto update [1] lands certificates from NSS 3.123.1 (Firefox 151.0.1's version), clearing out a substantial list of legacy certificate authorities that failed modern security standards. This is the kind of maintenance that keeps TLS chains trustworthy but requires you to validate if any internal or legacy systems relied on the removed roots. In parallel, Node added permission.drop [2], a new capability that lets you revoke permissions at runtime instead of being locked into initial grants, giving you finer control over what dangerous operations your code can execute. The undici core also got a simplification [3] to its abort listener utility, reducing complexity without breaking behavior. Over at amaro, SWC bumped to v1.15.40 [4] and the project shipped v1.1.10 [5] with workflow hardening post-CVE-2025-30066. The undici dependency chain picked up ws 8.21.0 [6], which fixes a remote memory exhaustion DoS and adds configurable buffering limits for fragmented messages.
Action items
- → Audit TLS chains if you rely on any removed root CAs (DigiCert, COMODO, QuoVadis, SecureTrust, Certigna, others) nodejs/node [plan]
- → Review permission.drop API if your app grants risky permissions at startup nodejs/node [monitor]
- → Update undici for the ws 8.21.0 DoS fix if you handle fragmented messages nodejs/undici [plan]
References
- [1] crypto: update root certificates to NSS 3.123.1 nodejs/node
- [2] lib,permission: add permission.drop nodejs/node
- [3] fix(core): simplify `addAbortListener` util (#5317) nodejs/undici
- [4] chore(deps): update SWC to v1.15.40 ↗ nodejs/amaro
- [5] v1.1.10 ↗ nodejs/amaro
- [6] build(deps-dev): bump ws from 8.20.0 to 8.21.0 ↗ nodejs/undici
FAQ
- What changed in Node.js on May 27, 2026?
- Node's certificate store just got pruned hard, removing 14 trusted roots including DigiCert and COMODO, while a new permission.drop API gives you runtime control over what your code can access.
- What should Node.js teams do about it?
- Audit TLS chains if you rely on any removed root CAs (DigiCert, COMODO, QuoVadis, SecureTrust, Certigna, others) • Review permission.drop API if your app grants risky permissions at startup • Update undici for the ws 8.21.0 DoS fix if you handle fragmented messages
- Which Node.js repositories shipped on May 27, 2026?
- nodejs/node, nodejs/undici, nodejs/amaro