$ the-wire · showcase
Open WebUI patches three terminal path and file-access security holes
By RepoJournal · Filed · About Open WebUI
Three merged commits close authorization and injection gaps in file access, proxy path decoding, and terminal WebSocket handling.
A file-access authorization fix [1] now confines object-derived write permissions to files the object owner actually owns. Previously, any user with write access to a knowledge base or workspace model could write or delete any file attached to it, even files they could only read.
Two terminal and proxy hardening fixes [2] [3] fail closed when decode caps are exceeded and encode the WebSocket session_id. The decode-until-stable loops now reject paths instead of forwarding still-encoded traversal sequences, and the session_id no longer allows injected query parameters to reach the upstream terminal server.
UI and store fixes [4] [5] improve code execution settings display and deduplicate frontend store fetches.
Action items
- → Upgrade open-webui to include commit 17df026 for the file-access authorization fix open-webui/open-webui [immediate]
- → Upgrade to include commits 05098d2 and 5f3a628 for terminal and proxy hardening open-webui/open-webui [immediate]
- → Monitor for any release notes covering the UI and store fixes open-webui/open-webui [monitor]
References
- [1] Confer object-derived file write only for files the object owner owns (#26032) ↗ open-webui/open-webui
- [2] Fail closed when the proxy/redirect path decode cap is exceeded (#26050) ↗ open-webui/open-webui
- [3] Encode terminal ws session_id to block upstream user_id query injection (#26042) ↗ open-webui/open-webui
- [4] fix: collapse Code Execution settings when toggle is disabled ↗ open-webui/open-webui
- [5] fix: deduplicate store fetches with null-guards and mutex ↗ open-webui/open-webui